《邀请投票》| 任性开支
但 Democrats 将难以撤销总统议程,Tomas Philipson 如是写道

[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:Nov 5th 2026]
美国中期选举结果呈现出两组截然对立的经济现实:传统指标显示经济表现优于平均水平,然而民众在调查中表现出的经济不满情绪却与经济衰退时期相似,反映出深刻的心理落差。
美国远未陷入这种困境。第三季度实际国内生产总值年增长率健康回升至3.4%,较第二季度的2.2%显著上升。失业率与裁员水平保持低位,投资领域的强劲扩张——部分得益于缺乏过度监管的人工智能产业——为未来生产力增长提供了乐观预期。然而,密歇根大学消费者信心指数于10月份仅录得48.0,较去年同期下滑至53.6。其衡量当前经济状况的子指数更低,仅为46.7。此类数据历史上常与严重经济压力相关联。
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:The election results may be explained in part by a continued—and generally faster-than-expected—rise in the prices of food, gasoline, housing and much else. Many households with rising nominal wages have endured real wage declines this year.]
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:Democrats naturally took full advantage of public anxiety over affordability during the election campaign. They omitted to mention that much of the rise in prices happened on Joe Biden's watch. The unadjusted CPI-U consumer-price index jumped by $21.4\%$ during his four years in office, compared with $6.1\%$ during the first 20 months of Donald Trump's second term.]
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:The economic statistics are not wrong, and households are not imagining their bills. They are looking at different dimensions of economic activity and prosperity. Until real wage growth makes the cumulative inflation shock less painful, Americans may continue to feel economically insecure even as the aggregate economy expands. Ordinary voters do not experience the economy as a quarterly GDP rate or a stock index. They experience it through how much their paycheques can buy and, as this election illustrated, that purchasing power is not always synchronised with the aggregate statistics.]
选民普遍将持续通胀归咎于伊朗战争和关税。本次选举的讽刺之处在于,这两项政策正是新一届民主党国会最难逆转的政策。
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:Start with the Iran war. The president began it in February without congressional authorisation. A resolution to curb his war powers would need support from two-thirds of both chambers to survive his veto, and Democrats are well short of that. And much as the new]
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:Congress may wish to choke off funding for what it sees as military adventurism, few members would vote to defund troops already in the field.]
关税问题同样面临类似情形。在二月(第2月)美国最高法院作出不利裁决后,行政部门依据另一项法案重新实施关税,有效期最长不超过150天,除非国会延长。随后,行政部门将其转移至更为永久性的《第301条》框架下。民主党人士可申请或交易特定国家或商品的豁免,但任何更广泛的逆转举措均将遭到总统否决。
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:Other parts of the White House agenda will survive the election as well. Chief among them is Mr Trump's welcome deregulatory programme. An executive order signed in January 2025 told agencies to retire ten rules for every new one. Its impact has been impressive: in the 2025 fiscal year, the White House regulatory office counted 646 deregulatory actions against five new rules, with claimed savings of \$212bn.]
本届国会的大部分减少监管举措已成定局。诚然,任何一届国会临近结束时发布的联邦机构规则,均可通过《国会审查法》的“回顾机制”被下一届国会推翻。然而,行政部门可能会力争在2028年前通过“公告-评论式规则制定程序”完成主要规则的出台,从而使得较少规则具有可逆性。
大选的财政影响尚不明确。若以近期历史为鉴,新一届分权政府(Divided)将更倾向于增加而非减少开支。自2013年以来,每当总统缺乏对Congress的全面控制或需求参议院反对党支持时,随之达成的预算协议总是同时满足双方优先事项的开支需求。共和党获得更多国防支出,民主党则获益于国内项目。在典型的‘利益交换’(logroll)机制下,双方相互支持对方开支以换取自身利益。2013年和2015年的协议维持了‘均衡’(parity),即国防和非国防开支同等增长。2018年,参议院共和党将国防开支增长超过国内支出视为胜利,但仍在两年内为国内项目额外拨款1310亿美元。
近期历史经验与长期以来的观点相悖,即分权政府(Divided)应对开支起到制约作用。例如,卡托研究所(Cato Institute)的威廉·尼斯卡宁(William Niskanen)发现,从德怀特·艾森豪威尔(Dwight Eisenhower)到比尔·克林顿(Bill Clinton)时期,当两党分掌华盛顿权力时,Real联邦开支增长速度反而放缓。
过去十五年的利益交换表明了另一种趋势。每一项协议均在分权或少数党需求参议院支持的背景下达成,且均突破了Congress为自身设定的开支限制。换句话说,分权政府已成为双方通过额外开支换取彼此同意的手段。此外,这是一个热衷于达成协议的White House。唯有乐观者才会期望新一轮僵局能减缓政府债务增长及其带来的更高利率风险。
托马斯·J·菲利普森曾于唐纳德·特朗普总统首任期内担任经济顾问委员会代理主席。
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:By Invitation | Charge!]
穆拉特·库鲁姆(COP31主席)指出,这一转型不能仅依赖市场力量。

Nov 5th 2026
30 年来,全球气候谈判始终聚焦于能源系统的供给端。联合国气候峰会(COP)年度会议的核心争议,一直围绕风力涡轮机与烟囱、太阳能电池板与管道之间的对抗。然而,如何利用这些能源实现建筑、交通和工业领域的电气化,却长期被忽视——尽管这些领域贡献了近一半的温室气体排放。
电气化转型如今正迎来其‘阳光时刻’,如同今夏的北欧城市般。随着能源经济格局的变化,机遇已然出现:能源价格急剧上涨,民生成本压力加剧,同时绿色技术成本则持续下降。初步数据显示,市场正在今年加速转型,越来越多的电气化技术正从概念走向实施。
倡导者经常坚称绿色技术的经济论据清晰明确。然而,仅依赖市场力量解决能源转型的期望不切实际。尽管现有趋势显示电气化进程正在加速,但其增长速度仍然过于缓慢——从目前占全球终端能源消费的 23% 增长到 2035 年的 29%。这远低于科学界所预测的 35%,后者才能确保气候目标的实现。因此,亟需政府干预。
2015 年的《巴黎协定》法律上要求各国定期提交气候计划。这些计划已成为推动气候政策的主要机制。然而,在最新一轮的计划中,电气化问题几乎被完全忽略。
电气化目标往往仅隐含在总体减排目标中,类似于因已设定总体增长目标而忽略制定人工智能战略。政府承诺声明、专属政策框架及激励结构等,都是传递关键市场信号的必要手段。
自海湾冲突爆发以来,已有25个国家宣布推出新政策以推动电气化进程。这只是一个开端,但尚不足够。具体而言,各国必须聚焦于缩短投资电气化技术的回收期,并确保基础设施建设以保障其实施。
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:Rarely is electric tech cheaper upfront. For consumers, the economic case rests on higher efficiency and lower running costs. Electric vehicles use 70-80% less energy and can save between \$200 and \$1,500 per year. But too often, it still takes too long to pay back the initial premium.]
电力相对于化石燃料的相对成本至关重要。欧盟委员会最近发现,一旦电力成本超过天然气成本的2.5倍,家庭转向热泵的经济性将急剧下降。政策制定者可通过改革不同能源来源的税收与补贴体系进行干预。在某些发达国家,税收占居民用电成本的30%,而大多数欧盟国家对电力的税收高于天然气。改革需权衡财政与社会经济需求,但整体上仍应优先调整以支持电力的竞争力。
为降低初始成本,各国政府长期以来采用直接补贴、优惠税率及社会支持计划等混合手段。土耳其快速推广电动汽车,主要得益于增值税减免降低了经销商处的标价。
多边开发银行及其他开发融资机构亦可通过赠款、优惠资本及贷款担保等方式降低资本成本。这对于发展中国家尤为关键,后者面临远高于发达国家的融资成本,严重制约了投资进程。
然而,这些激励措施需耗费资金。在财政紧缩的全球环境下,电气化必须更加努力争取有限资源的分配份额。不过,随着能源进口依赖所固有风险日益凸显,各国政府应准备重新审视加大支持力度的必要性。今年,已有95个国家推出紧急价格上限、补贴或燃油税减免等措施以援助消费者。公共资金或可更有效地用于补贴减少对波动全球市场暴露的相关设备。
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:Governments must also give consumers confidence that once they have bought their electric appliance, they will be able to run it. Otherwise, they will not risk the investment. However, 730m people lack electricity, and millions more have only unreliable access. Even in rich countries, low investment in grids is a constraint. There is simply no transition without transmission. Around \$1trn is needed each year for grids and storage between now and 2030. Permitting times need to be shortened. Outdated policy and regulatory frameworks that are based on old fuel sources rather than renewables need reform.]
如何推动电气化进程?作为 COP31 主席国,土耳其将电气化视为贯穿所有努力的“金线”或“铜线”。我们提出了全球“35×35”目标——到 2035 年实现 35% 的电气化率——以聚焦共识并跟踪进展。土耳其还以身作则,将于 COP 上公布其国家能源规划,作为将能源进口支出占 GDP 比重从 2.1% 降至 2050 年 0.7% 的努力之一。
各国将因地制宜制定电气化路径。总体而言,发达国家将优先发展电动汽车、热泵、低温工业供热及人工智能驱动的电网优化;发展中国家则更侧重于电动自行车、电烹饪炉具及工业电机的推广,并需扩大基础电力覆盖范围。后者还需获得国际捐助机构的更多支持。
整体而言,电气化进程不能仅依赖市场机制自发运作,后者无法充分释放能源安全、可负担性及减排潜力。我们需要构建政府与私营部门的合作伙伴关系,使私营部门能够全力推动电气化进程。土耳其将利用本次峰会敦促各方进一步明确承诺。最终,成败将体现在空气质量改善、全球气温下降以及社区不再受全球能源市场剧烈波动暴力冲击的程度。国际能源署数据显示,实现“35×35”目标每年可节省高达5000亿美元的进口燃料成本。市场已开启这一进程,但政府需完成剩余任务。
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:Murat Kurum is Turkey's environment minister and president of the COP31 climate-change conference.]
• 卸任前的特朗普(Donald Trump)将在海外从事何种活动?
简报 | 中期选举后
在国内陷入困境之际,这位总统将把目光投向海外。这令世界忧虑,但尚不明确他能够取得何种成就——无论是善是恶。

Nov 5th 2026
多格·索斯尼克(Doug Sosnik),比尔·克林顿(Bill Clinton)前顾问,回忆起总统在白宫任期最后阶段的紧张议程:「我们讨论过日程安排,以及还能进行多少次出访——你介意一天工作18小时吗?」克林顿是个急于行动的人。「我只剩下一年任期了,」他观察道,「我还有余生的时间去睡觉。」
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:The same clock now ticks for Donald Trump. He has been the defining protagonist of the past decade in American politics. But on November 3rd he became only the second term-limited president, after George W. Bush in 2006, to fight his final midterm election in control of both chambers of Congress and to lose both, shocking Mr Trump himself. "Wow," he told the New York Times upon learning of his party's loss in South Carolina, a former MAGA stronghold. "That's amazing."]
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:In his final two years in office, Mr Trump will be embattled at home as he confronts his political mortality. Congress, which Mr Trump had rendered largely irrelevant while under Republican control, will swamp his administration with hearings and subpoenas on corruption and abuse of power. ("Lawyer up," one congressman advised on X.) It will dare him to veto popular policies such as restoring health-care funding. Democrats will try to stop his vanity pursuits in the capital, too: his grand ballroom and his triumphal arch. But the area where he will continue to have the greatest, most unrestrained impact is overseas, where he will turn for monsters to slay and legacies to leave.]
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:Mr Trump's foreign policy—from Venezuela to Greenland to Iran—has been radical and hyperactive. Now it could become more so. Mr Trump has unfinished business in Iran and Cuba that could drag America deeper into the Middle East and Latin America. His flirtation with great-power carve-ups, including summitry with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, could herald a darker world order—and difficulties for Ukraine. His quixotic courtship of Kim Jong Un, North Korea's leader, could upturn American nuclear policy. All this will unfold as AI wizardry spirals towards artificial general intelligence, throwing up diplomatic and national-security challenges that will fall to Mr Trump to manage.]
若由一位外交天赋、工作热忱且注意力集中的总统执政,以上种种已足以令世界忧虑。然而,特朗普将不得不缺席这些关键品质——

这些品质固然重要,但特朗普政府还将面临另一个问题:在危机时刻可能失去经验丰富的工作人员——这也是‘落日总统’时期的典型特征。未来两年,总统在海外的‘冒险’行程注定将充满混乱与不可预测性,尽管未必能带来实质性成果。
艾森豪威尔
里根
克林顿
乔治·沃克·布什
奥巴马
特朗普
自1945年以来
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:Source: US Department of State, Office of the Historian]
特朗普并非在任期末寻求海外慰藉的唯一总统。英国《经济学人》杂志分析了自杜鲁门以来的总统出访记录,数据显示,总统在第二任期最后两年通常会大幅增加海外活动(见示意图)。小布什在2008年出访50天,是其此前年均出访时间的两倍。在2006年中期选举失利后,他下令对伊拉克增兵,尽管国会内部反对强烈,但他试图挽救已严重失控的战争。奥巴马在第一任期和第二任期最后两年的出访次数翻倍。其与伊朗达成的全面核协议出台于他自身在2014年中期选举中遭遇重创之后。《美国企业研究所》智库的尤瓦尔·莱文(Yuval Levin)曾在布什政府任职,他指出:“总统在任期末往往会对各种限制感到沮丧,而外交政策领域则是约束最少的领域。”
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:Mr Trump, like an impresario who changes the act when the audience grows weary, is drawn to foreign-policy manoeuvres that confound his critics and, in his mind, demonstrate his strength. Mr Trump has long boasted of his diplomatic prowess, famously claiming that he would end the Ukraine war in a day—and, at a midterms rally on November 1st, that he would have won the Vietnam war in a week. Mr Trump’s evident failure to win the war at hand, with Iran, therefore rankles with him. The two sides continue to skirmish, with America conducting what it described as “defensive” air strikes on November 2nd.]
特朗普政府时期遭美国军事打击的国家
■ 受威胁的军事打击计划

\*Some strikes conducted under joint operations
$^{\dagger}$ And Laccadive Sea $^{\ddagger}$ Includes the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman Sources: ACLED; press reports
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:Until recently Mr Trump was leaning towards his third attack on Iran in 18 months (see map), in concert with Israel, to force it to fully reopen the Strait of Hormuz and limit its nuclear programme. That would trigger Iranian retaliation against Gulf energy facilities, consuming Mr Trump's attention for months to come. On October 28th Chris Murphy, a Democratic senator, said that he had received an intelligence briefing on America's war plans. "I will just say this—their plan is insane," said Mr Murphy, noting that public reporting had pointed to the targeting of civilian infrastructure. "It will lead to devastating escalation and the likely destruction of our commitment to the rule of law." (Three days later Mr Murphy went to hospital after suffering a stroke.) A person familiar with the planning says that Mr Trump was considering whether to strike Iranian oil tankers in Asia.]
近日,其他消息来源称特朗普已暂停相关计划,并向以色列总理内塔尼亚胡(Binyamin Netanyahu)明确表示,美国不会支持以色列发动军事行动。已做好攻击准备的以色列军队随即暂停了相关军事准备工作。
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:Mr Trump will face opposition to fresh strikes from multiple sources. One is J.D. Vance, his vice-president—and a probable candidate for president in 2028—who, in a post on X on November 4th, explicitly blamed the midterms drubbing on the war and said voters wanted a different relationship with Israel. Another is Congress. Such is the scale of the blue wave and so detested is the war—on a par with the Vietnam war—that Democrats might withhold funding (and risk being accused of undermining the troops in the field). Even if Mr Trump chooses to escalate, America is unlikely to have the munitions, air-defence interceptors or political stomach for another protracted campaign. Mr Trump’s aim is presumably to secure a deal that allows him to emerge from the fracas with the appearance of an honourable peace. Iran’s leadership, conscious of Mr Trump’s political frailty, is unlikely to fold easily.]
特朗普总统的外交议程中,伊朗或将成为首个考验,而乌克兰则可能成为第二个。在此问题上,总统的报复性本能构成重大风险。特朗普一再将乌克兰战争归咎于该国,批评其对俄罗斯炼油厂的打击行动,并贬低乌克兰总统泽连斯基。迄今为止,美国与乌克兰的情报共享以及通过欧洲的军售尚未受到影响。当美国谈判代表于2025年11月公布一份不成熟的28条和平计划时,特朗普的国务卿马可·鲁比奥及欧洲盟友介入,削减了其中最恶劣的部分。在每个关键节点,特朗普都未采取完全放弃乌克兰并转向俄罗斯的举措。
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:Mr Trump may direct his ire once again at Mr Zelensky, should he conclude—wrongly—that Ukraine’s strikes on Russian refineries were primarily responsible for the fuel-price shock that helped doom Republicans at the polls. In 2020 Mr Trump responded furiously after believing that China had misled him over the spread of covid-19. A similar sense of betrayal could translate into a more aggressive pressure campaign against Mr Zelensky personally and Ukraine as a whole, with the aim of forcing Ukraine’s capitulation.]
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:An early glimpse of Mr Trump's post-midterms mood may come on November 18th-19th, when he and Mr Putin visit Shenzhen, China, for an international summit hosted by Mr Xi. America's European allies fret that Ukraine will be on the menu. In recent months, Mr Trump has made concession after concession to Russia, cutting a deal to buy diesel and waiving sanctions in return for the release of an American prisoner, in part to lure Mr Putin to the negotiating table. Mr Putin may conclude that he will never again enjoy as pliant a partner as Mr Trump. But the Russian leader also believes that time is on his side, and that European support for Ukraine will ebb away. What is more, Democrats in Congress can be expected to hinder or block efforts by Mr Trump to give Mr Putin more ground on Ukraine—especially any deal that reeks of corruption.]
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:The president may quickly lose interest (not for the first time) in the quagmire of Ukraine and turn his attention to another developing hot spot in his own hemisphere: Cuba. Since taking office, Mr Trump has squeezed Cuba's dictatorship economically, causing power cuts, food shortages and a collapse of health care on the island. In January 2026 the president decapitated Venezuela's government by abducting Nicolás Maduro, its leader. He is thought to be tempted by a similar model of light-touch regime change in Cuba.]
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:America's economic warfare is intended both to weaken the regime and split the country's elite, potentially throwing up partners who might work with America, much as Delcy Rodríguez, Venezuela's acting leader, abandoned Mr Maduro. Mr Trump has made little secret of his goal. "We'll take care of Cuba on our way back from Iran," he boasted on the campaign trail in October. That month Mr Rubio, a Cuban-American hawk, urged disaffected Cubans to work with the CIA: "To those who seek to create positive change in Cuba—now is the time."]
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:Mr Trump longs to be a president who achieves what his predecessors did not. He would relish being the leader who reversed the Cuban communist victory of 1959. But he is not a man for details. In Venezuela he has largely left the country's dictatorship in place, swapping its leaders and cutting grubby deals to secure its oil for American firms. A fudge like that would be far harder to pull off in Cuba, notes a person with knowledge of the administration's debates, because Cuba's diaspora—which is older and more established than Venezuela's—would make its wrath felt.]
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:It would arguably help Mr Trump's chances of success in his foreign-policy endeavours if he had experienced staffers around him. But an exodus may be under way. Mr Rubio, who also serves as national security adviser, has quietly been exploring jobs in the private sector. (He may skip the 2028 presidential race, hoping for more favourable conditions in 2032.) Mr Rubio's departure would shift the balance of the administration, potentially leaving John Ratcliffe, the director of the CIA, as the most influential hawk in the cabinet.]
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:The president may also lose his favourite man at the Pentagon. Many Democrats want to impeach Pete Hegseth, the pugnacious and divisive secretary of war. Hakeem Jeffries, the likely Democratic Speaker of the House, has not ruled it out.]
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:Democrats may demand Mr Hegseth's ousting as the price of passing an \$87.6bn supplemental bill including \$67bn for the Department of War, which is in a deep financial hole. Presidents often seek scapegoats after an electoral pummelling. Mr Bush dumped Donald Rumsfeld, his defence secretary, after his midterm loss in 2006; Mr Trump sacked Jeff Sessions, his then attorney-general, after his party's defeat in the House in 2018.]
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:Yet Mr Trump is more likely to respond with defiance than with contrition. There is speculation that Mr Hegseth could be shunted into the job of national security adviser or possibly appointed to the Senate seat for Tennessee that is to be vacated in January by Marsha Blackburn, who has been elected the state's governor. There, some note, he would enjoy a degree of protection from Democratic probes—including those into his deadly strikes on boats thought to be carrying drugs.]
By Invitation | Vote, splurge
《邀请投票》| 任性开支
# America 分裂政府将意味着更多开支,而非减少
But Democrats will struggle to unwind the president's agenda, writes Tomas Philipson
但 Democrats 将难以撤销总统议程,Tomas Philipson 如是写道

Nov 5th 2026
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:Nov 5th 2026]
THE RESULT of America's midterm elections occurred under two sets of conflicting facts: by many conventional measures the economy is performing above average, yet Americans remain deeply dissatisfied with their economic circumstances, displaying attitudes in surveys more typical of those during a recession.
美国中期选举结果呈现出两组截然对立的经济现实:传统指标显示经济表现优于平均水平,然而民众在调查中表现出的经济不满情绪却与经济衰退时期相似,反映出深刻的心理落差。
And America is far from being in that predicament. Real GDP grew at a healthy 3.4% annual rate in the third quarter, up from 2.2% in the second. Unemployment and layoffs are low and the roaring expansion in investment, partly thanks to an AI sector free from excessive regulation, offers reasons for optimism about future productivity. Yet the University of Michigan's consumer-sentiment index stood at just 48.0 in October, down from 53.6 a year earlier. Its index of current economic conditions was even lower, at 46.7. Such readings have in the past been associated with severe economic stress.
美国远未陷入这种困境。第三季度实际国内生产总值年增长率健康回升至3.4%,较第二季度的2.2%显著上升。失业率与裁员水平保持低位,投资领域的强劲扩张——部分得益于缺乏过度监管的人工智能产业——为未来生产力增长提供了乐观预期。然而,密歇根大学消费者信心指数于10月份仅录得48.0,较去年同期下滑至53.6。其衡量当前经济状况的子指数更低,仅为46.7。此类数据历史上常与严重经济压力相关联。
The election results may be explained in part by a continued—and generally faster-than-expected—rise in the prices of food, gasoline, housing and much else. Many households with rising nominal wages have endured real wage declines this year.
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:The election results may be explained in part by a continued—and generally faster-than-expected—rise in the prices of food, gasoline, housing and much else. Many households with rising nominal wages have endured real wage declines this year.]
Democrats naturally took full advantage of public anxiety over affordability during the election campaign. They omitted to mention that much of the rise in prices happened on Joe Biden's watch. The unadjusted CPI-U consumer-price index jumped by $21.4\%$ during his four years in office, compared with $6.1\%$ during the first 20 months of Donald Trump's second term.
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:Democrats naturally took full advantage of public anxiety over affordability during the election campaign. They omitted to mention that much of the rise in prices happened on Joe Biden's watch. The unadjusted CPI-U consumer-price index jumped by $21.4\%$ during his four years in office, compared with $6.1\%$ during the first 20 months of Donald Trump's second term.]
The economic statistics are not wrong, and households are not imagining their bills. They are looking at different dimensions of economic activity and prosperity. Until real wage growth makes the cumulative inflation shock less painful, Americans may continue to feel economically insecure even as the aggregate economy expands. Ordinary voters do not experience the economy as a quarterly GDP rate or a stock index. They experience it through how much their paycheques can buy and, as this election illustrated, that purchasing power is not always synchronised with the aggregate statistics.
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:The economic statistics are not wrong, and households are not imagining their bills. They are looking at different dimensions of economic activity and prosperity. Until real wage growth makes the cumulative inflation shock less painful, Americans may continue to feel economically insecure even as the aggregate economy expands. Ordinary voters do not experience the economy as a quarterly GDP rate or a stock index. They experience it through how much their paycheques can buy and, as this election illustrated, that purchasing power is not always synchronised with the aggregate statistics.]
Voters mostly blame the Iran war and tariffs for persistent inflation. The irony of this election is that these are the two policies the new Democratic Congress will find hardest to reverse.
选民普遍将持续通胀归咎于伊朗战争和关税。本次选举的讽刺之处在于,这两项政策正是新一届民主党国会最难逆转的政策。
Start with the Iran war. The president began it in February without congressional authorisation. A resolution to curb his war powers would need support from two-thirds of both chambers to survive his veto, and Democrats are well short of that. And much as the new
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:Start with the Iran war. The president began it in February without congressional authorisation. A resolution to curb his war powers would need support from two-thirds of both chambers to survive his veto, and Democrats are well short of that. And much as the new]
Congress may wish to choke off funding for what it sees as military adventurism, few members would vote to defund troops already in the field.
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:Congress may wish to choke off funding for what it sees as military adventurism, few members would vote to defund troops already in the field.]
It is a similar story with tariffs. After an adverse ruling by the Supreme Court in February, the administration reissued the duties under another statute, limited to 150 days unless Congress extends the term. The administration then moved them to a more permanent "Section 301" footing. Democrats can ask for, or trade, exemptions for particular countries or goods, but any broader reversal would be vetoed by the president.
关税问题同样面临类似情形。在二月(第2月)美国最高法院作出不利裁决后,行政部门依据另一项法案重新实施关税,有效期最长不超过150天,除非国会延长。随后,行政部门将其转移至更为永久性的《第301条》框架下。民主党人士可申请或交易特定国家或商品的豁免,但任何更广泛的逆转举措均将遭到总统否决。
Other parts of the White House agenda will survive the election as well. Chief among them is Mr Trump's welcome deregulatory programme. An executive order signed in January 2025 told agencies to retire ten rules for every new one. Its impact has been impressive: in the 2025 fiscal year, the White House regulatory office counted 646 deregulatory actions against five new rules, with claimed savings of \$212bn.
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:Other parts of the White House agenda will survive the election as well. Chief among them is Mr Trump's welcome deregulatory programme. An executive order signed in January 2025 told agencies to retire ten rules for every new one. Its impact has been impressive: in the 2025 fiscal year, the White House regulatory office counted 646 deregulatory actions against five new rules, with claimed savings of \$212bn.]
Much of the deregulation drive is baked in for this Congress. It is true that federal-agency rules issued towards the very end of any given Congress can be overturned by the subsequent one using the Congressional Review Act “lookback” mechanism. However, the administration will probably aim to finish its major rules through notice-and-comment rulemaking well before 2028, meaning that fewer of them will be reversible.
本届国会的大部分减少监管举措已成定局。诚然,任何一届国会临近结束时发布的联邦机构规则,均可通过《国会审查法》的“回顾机制”被下一届国会推翻。然而,行政部门可能会力争在2028年前通过“公告-评论式规则制定程序”完成主要规则的出台,从而使得较少规则具有可逆性。
The election's fiscal impact is less clear. If recent history is a guide, the new divided government will agree to spend more, not less. Since 2013, whenever a president has lacked full control of Congress or needed opposition votes in the Senate, the budget deal that followed has raised spending on both parties' priorities at once. Republicans got more for defence, Democrats more for domestic programmes. In a classic logroll, each side voted for the other's spending to secure its own. The 2013 and 2015 deals kept "parity", with equal increases for defence and non-defence spending. In 2018 Senate Republicans counted it a win that defence rose more than domestic spending, but they still conceded \$131bn more for domestic programmes over two years.
大选的财政影响尚不明确。若以近期历史为鉴,新一届分权政府(Divided)将更倾向于增加而非减少开支。自2013年以来,每当总统缺乏对Congress的全面控制或需求参议院反对党支持时,随之达成的预算协议总是同时满足双方优先事项的开支需求。共和党获得更多国防支出,民主党则获益于国内项目。在典型的‘利益交换’(logroll)机制下,双方相互支持对方开支以换取自身利益。2013年和2015年的协议维持了‘均衡’(parity),即国防和非国防开支同等增长。2018年,参议院共和党将国防开支增长超过国内支出视为胜利,但仍在两年内为国内项目额外拨款1310亿美元。
This recent history cuts against a long-held view that divided government acts as a brake on spending. For instance, William Niskanen of the Cato Institute, a think-tank, found that, from Dwight Eisenhower to Bill Clinton, real federal spending grew more slowly when the two parties split control of Washington.
近期历史经验与长期以来的观点相悖,即分权政府(Divided)应对开支起到制约作用。例如,卡托研究所(Cato Institute)的威廉·尼斯卡宁(William Niskanen)发现,从德怀特·艾森豪威尔(Dwight Eisenhower)到比尔·克林顿(Bill Clinton)时期,当两党分掌华盛顿权力时,Real联邦开支增长速度反而放缓。
The horse-trading of the past decade and a half points in a different direction. Each of the deals came under split control, or when the minority's Senate votes were needed, and each raised spending above the limits Congress had set for itself. On the annual budget, in short, divided governments have become a way for each side to buy the other's agreement with additional spending. Added to which, this is a White House that likes to make deals. Only an optimist could expect growth in government debt, and the associated risk of higher interest rates, to be lessened by the new gridlock.
过去十五年的利益交换表明了另一种趋势。每一项协议均在分权或少数党需求参议院支持的背景下达成,且均突破了Congress为自身设定的开支限制。换句话说,分权政府已成为双方通过额外开支换取彼此同意的手段。此外,这是一个热衷于达成协议的White House。唯有乐观者才会期望新一轮僵局能减缓政府债务增长及其带来的更高利率风险。
Tomas J. Philipson was acting chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers during President Donald Trump's first term.
托马斯·J·菲利普森曾于唐纳德·特朗普总统首任期内担任经济顾问委员会代理主席。
By Invitation | Charge!
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:By Invitation | Charge!]
# 市场推动电气化进程,政府应加大政策支持力度
The transformation can't be left to market forces alone, writes Murat Kurum, president of COP31
穆拉特·库鲁姆(COP31主席)指出,这一转型不能仅依赖市场力量。

Nov 5th 2026
FOR 30 YEARS global climate talks have focused on what's feeding power systems. The defining battles of the annual COP UN climate summits have been between wind turbines and chimney stacks; solar panels and pipelines. How we use that power to electrify buildings, transport and industry has been largely ignored, despite these sectors producing almost half of emissions.
30 年来,全球气候谈判始终聚焦于能源系统的供给端。联合国气候峰会(COP)年度会议的核心争议,一直围绕风力涡轮机与烟囱、太阳能电池板与管道之间的对抗。然而,如何利用这些能源实现建筑、交通和工业领域的电气化,却长期被忽视——尽管这些领域贡献了近一半的温室气体排放。
Like a northern European city this summer, electrification is now getting its day in the sun. An opportunity has opened up as the economics have shifted. Energy prices are rising sharply, cost-of-living pressures are biting and green-technology costs are plummeting. Preliminary data indicate markets are moving this year as more electric tech is shifting off the shelves.
电气化转型如今正迎来其‘阳光时刻’,如同今夏的北欧城市般。随着能源经济格局的变化,机遇已然出现:能源价格急剧上涨,民生成本压力加剧,同时绿色技术成本则持续下降。初步数据显示,市场正在今年加速转型,越来越多的电气化技术正从概念走向实施。
Campaigners often insist the economic case for green technology is clear. But hopes that market forces alone will solve the energy transition are misplaced. Even with building momentum, existing trends indicate electrification is expanding too slowly—from meeting 23% of the world’s final energy consumption today to 29% by 2035. This is not the 35% that the science says will keep climate goals within reach. State intervention is still needed, urgently.
倡导者经常坚称绿色技术的经济论据清晰明确。然而,仅依赖市场力量解决能源转型的期望不切实际。尽管现有趋势显示电气化进程正在加速,但其增长速度仍然过于缓慢——从目前占全球终端能源消费的 23% 增长到 2035 年的 29%。这远低于科学界所预测的 35%,后者才能确保气候目标的实现。因此,亟需政府干预。
The Paris agreement of 2015 legally required countries to submit regular climate plans. These plans have been the main mechanism for driving climate policy. However, in the latest round of plans electrification was largely absent.
2015 年的《巴黎协定》法律上要求各国定期提交气候计划。这些计划已成为推动气候政策的主要机制。然而,在最新一轮的计划中,电气化问题几乎被完全忽略。
Too often, electrification targets are merely implicit within headline emission-reduction goals. Think of it like neglecting to produce an AI strategy because you already have a headline growth target. Statements of government commitment, bespoke policy frameworks and incentive structures are all essential to sending important market signals.
电气化目标往往仅隐含在总体减排目标中,类似于因已设定总体增长目标而忽略制定人工智能战略。政府承诺声明、专属政策框架及激励结构等,都是传递关键市场信号的必要手段。
Since the start of the conflict in the Gulf, 25 countries have announced new policies to support greater electrification. That is a start, but not enough. Specifically, they must focus on reducing the payback periods of investing in electric tech and guaranteeing the infrastructure to make it work.
自海湾冲突爆发以来,已有25个国家宣布推出新政策以推动电气化进程。这只是一个开端,但尚不足够。具体而言,各国必须聚焦于缩短投资电气化技术的回收期,并确保基础设施建设以保障其实施。
Rarely is electric tech cheaper upfront. For consumers, the economic case rests on higher efficiency and lower running costs. Electric vehicles use 70-80% less energy and can save between \$200 and \$1,500 per year. But too often, it still takes too long to pay back the initial premium.
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:Rarely is electric tech cheaper upfront. For consumers, the economic case rests on higher efficiency and lower running costs. Electric vehicles use 70-80% less energy and can save between \$200 and \$1,500 per year. But too often, it still takes too long to pay back the initial premium.]
The relative cost of electricity compared to fossil fuels is critical. The European Commission recently found that once electricity costs more than 2.5 times as much as natural gas, the case for households to switch to heat pumps weakens sharply. Policymakers can intervene by reforming the tapestries of taxes and subsidies on different energy sources. In some developed countries, taxes make up 30% of the cost of residential electricity, and most EU countries tax electricity more than natural gas. Reforms need balancing against fiscal and socioeconomic needs, but the overall imperative to rebalance in favour of electricity remains.
电力相对于化石燃料的相对成本至关重要。欧盟委员会最近发现,一旦电力成本超过天然气成本的2.5倍,家庭转向热泵的经济性将急剧下降。政策制定者可通过改革不同能源来源的税收与补贴体系进行干预。在某些发达国家,税收占居民用电成本的30%,而大多数欧盟国家对电力的税收高于天然气。改革需权衡财政与社会经济需求,但整体上仍应优先调整以支持电力的竞争力。
To reduce upfront costs, governments have long deployed a mixture of direct subsidies, preferential tax rates and social-support schemes. Türkiye's rapid adoption of electric vehicles has been driven by reductions in value-added tax that lower sticker prices at the dealership.
为降低初始成本,各国政府长期以来采用直接补贴、优惠税率及社会支持计划等混合手段。土耳其快速推广电动汽车,主要得益于增值税减免降低了经销商处的标价。
Multilateral development banks and other development-finance institutions can also use grant-based and concessional capital along with loan guarantees to lower the cost of capital. This is particularly important for developing countries, which face far higher borrowing costs that are holding back investment.
多边开发银行及其他开发融资机构亦可通过赠款、优惠资本及贷款担保等方式降低资本成本。这对于发展中国家尤为关键,后者面临远高于发达国家的融资成本,严重制约了投资进程。
But these incentives cost money. In a fiscally constrained world, electrification must fight harder for a share of a shrinking pie. Nevertheless, as the inherent risks of energy import dependency come more sharply into view, governments should be ready to review the case for more aggressive support. This year 95 countries have introduced emergency price caps, subsidies or fuel-levy cuts to support consumers. Public money might be better spent subsidising the equipment needed to reduce exposure to volatile global markets.
然而,这些激励措施需耗费资金。在财政紧缩的全球环境下,电气化必须更加努力争取有限资源的分配份额。不过,随着能源进口依赖所固有风险日益凸显,各国政府应准备重新审视加大支持力度的必要性。今年,已有95个国家推出紧急价格上限、补贴或燃油税减免等措施以援助消费者。公共资金或可更有效地用于补贴减少对波动全球市场暴露的相关设备。
Governments must also give consumers confidence that once they have bought their electric appliance, they will be able to run it. Otherwise, they will not risk the investment. However, 730m people lack electricity, and millions more have only unreliable access. Even in rich countries, low investment in grids is a constraint. There is simply no transition without transmission. Around \$1trn is needed each year for grids and storage between now and 2030. Permitting times need to be shortened. Outdated policy and regulatory frameworks that are based on old fuel sources rather than renewables need reform.
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:Governments must also give consumers confidence that once they have bought their electric appliance, they will be able to run it. Otherwise, they will not risk the investment. However, 730m people lack electricity, and millions more have only unreliable access. Even in rich countries, low investment in grids is a constraint. There is simply no transition without transmission. Around \$1trn is needed each year for grids and storage between now and 2030. Permitting times need to be shortened. Outdated policy and regulatory frameworks that are based on old fuel sources rather than renewables need reform.]
So how to kick-start progress? As chair of COP31, Türkiye is making electrification the golden thread, or copper wire, connecting all our efforts. We have proposed a global “35-by-35” target—35% electrification by 2035—to focus minds and enable us to track progress. Türkiye is also leading by example and will publish its national energy plan at COP as part of our efforts to reduce spending on energy imports from 2.1% of GDP to 0.7% by 2050.
如何推动电气化进程?作为 COP31 主席国,土耳其将电气化视为贯穿所有努力的“金线”或“铜线”。我们提出了全球“35×35”目标——到 2035 年实现 35% 的电气化率——以聚焦共识并跟踪进展。土耳其还以身作则,将于 COP 上公布其国家能源规划,作为将能源进口支出占 GDP 比重从 2.1% 降至 2050 年 0.7% 的努力之一。
Everyone will have their own pathway. Broadly speaking, developed countries will favour electric cars, heat pumps, low-level industrial heating and AI-driven grid optimisation. Developing countries will focus more on electric bikes, cooking-stoves and industrial motors, which require expanding basic electricity access. They will also need more support from international donors.
各国将因地制宜制定电气化路径。总体而言,发达国家将优先发展电动汽车、热泵、低温工业供热及人工智能驱动的电网优化;发展中国家则更侧重于电动自行车、电烹饪炉具及工业电机的推广,并需扩大基础电力覆盖范围。后者还需获得国际捐助机构的更多支持。
Overall, we cannot leave electrification to market forces alone. They will not fully deliver the potential for energy security, affordability and emission reductions. We need a partnership where governments enable the private sector to throw its full weight behind electrification. Türkiye will use the summit to press everyone to show what more they can do. In the end, success will be measured in cleaner air, lower global temperatures and communities no longer at the mercy of violently convulsing global energy markets. The International Energy Agency shows that the 35-by-35 target could save \$500bn each year in avoided fuel imports. Markets have started this journey. Governments need to finish it.
整体而言,电气化进程不能仅依赖市场机制自发运作,后者无法充分释放能源安全、可负担性及减排潜力。我们需要构建政府与私营部门的合作伙伴关系,使私营部门能够全力推动电气化进程。土耳其将利用本次峰会敦促各方进一步明确承诺。最终,成败将体现在空气质量改善、全球气温下降以及社区不再受全球能源市场剧烈波动暴力冲击的程度。国际能源署数据显示,实现“35×35”目标每年可节省高达5000亿美元的进口燃料成本。市场已开启这一进程,但政府需完成剩余任务。
Murat Kurum is Turkey's environment minister and president of the COP31 climate-change conference.
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:Murat Kurum is Turkey's environment minister and president of the COP31 climate-change conference.]
## 政策简报
• What will a lame-duck Donald Trump get up to overseas?
• 卸任前的特朗普(Donald Trump)将在海外从事何种活动?
Briefing | After the midterms
简报 | 中期选举后
# 卸任前的特朗普(Donald Trump)将在海外从事何种活动?
Embattled at home, the president will look abroad. That is worrying for the world, but it is not clear what he can achieve—for good or ill
在国内陷入困境之际,这位总统将把目光投向海外。这令世界忧虑,但尚不明确他能够取得何种成就——无论是善是恶。

Nov 5th 2026
DOUG SOSNIK, a former adviser to Bill Clinton, recalls the president's frenetic agenda during his final stretch in the White House. "We talked about the schedule and how many more trips we could do—do you mind doing an 18-hour day?" Mr Clinton was a man in a hurry. "I've only got a year left in office," he observed. "I've got the rest of my life to sleep."
多格·索斯尼克(Doug Sosnik),比尔·克林顿(Bill Clinton)前顾问,回忆起总统在白宫任期最后阶段的紧张议程:「我们讨论过日程安排,以及还能进行多少次出访——你介意一天工作18小时吗?」克林顿是个急于行动的人。「我只剩下一年任期了,」他观察道,「我还有余生的时间去睡觉。」
The same clock now ticks for Donald Trump. He has been the defining protagonist of the past decade in American politics. But on November 3rd he became only the second term-limited president, after George W. Bush in 2006, to fight his final midterm election in control of both chambers of Congress and to lose both, shocking Mr Trump himself. "Wow," he told the New York Times upon learning of his party's loss in South Carolina, a former MAGA stronghold. "That's amazing."
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:The same clock now ticks for Donald Trump. He has been the defining protagonist of the past decade in American politics. But on November 3rd he became only the second term-limited president, after George W. Bush in 2006, to fight his final midterm election in control of both chambers of Congress and to lose both, shocking Mr Trump himself. "Wow," he told the New York Times upon learning of his party's loss in South Carolina, a former MAGA stronghold. "That's amazing."]
In his final two years in office, Mr Trump will be embattled at home as he confronts his political mortality. Congress, which Mr Trump had rendered largely irrelevant while under Republican control, will swamp his administration with hearings and subpoenas on corruption and abuse of power. ("Lawyer up," one congressman advised on X.) It will dare him to veto popular policies such as restoring health-care funding. Democrats will try to stop his vanity pursuits in the capital, too: his grand ballroom and his triumphal arch. But the area where he will continue to have the greatest, most unrestrained impact is overseas, where he will turn for monsters to slay and legacies to leave.
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:In his final two years in office, Mr Trump will be embattled at home as he confronts his political mortality. Congress, which Mr Trump had rendered largely irrelevant while under Republican control, will swamp his administration with hearings and subpoenas on corruption and abuse of power. ("Lawyer up," one congressman advised on X.) It will dare him to veto popular policies such as restoring health-care funding. Democrats will try to stop his vanity pursuits in the capital, too: his grand ballroom and his triumphal arch. But the area where he will continue to have the greatest, most unrestrained impact is overseas, where he will turn for monsters to slay and legacies to leave.]
Mr Trump's foreign policy—from Venezuela to Greenland to Iran—has been radical and hyperactive. Now it could become more so. Mr Trump has unfinished business in Iran and Cuba that could drag America deeper into the Middle East and Latin America. His flirtation with great-power carve-ups, including summitry with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, could herald a darker world order—and difficulties for Ukraine. His quixotic courtship of Kim Jong Un, North Korea's leader, could upturn American nuclear policy. All this will unfold as AI wizardry spirals towards artificial general intelligence, throwing up diplomatic and national-security challenges that will fall to Mr Trump to manage.
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:Mr Trump's foreign policy—from Venezuela to Greenland to Iran—has been radical and hyperactive. Now it could become more so. Mr Trump has unfinished business in Iran and Cuba that could drag America deeper into the Middle East and Latin America. His flirtation with great-power carve-ups, including summitry with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, could herald a darker world order—and difficulties for Ukraine. His quixotic courtship of Kim Jong Un, North Korea's leader, could upturn American nuclear policy. All this will unfold as AI wizardry spirals towards artificial general intelligence, throwing up diplomatic and national-security challenges that will fall to Mr Trump to manage.]
All this would be concerning enough for the world under a president who had a gift for diplomacy, a Herculean work ethic and a normal attention span. Mr Trump not only will have to do without those
若由一位外交天赋、工作热忱且注意力集中的总统执政,以上种种已足以令世界忧虑。然而,特朗普将不得不缺席这些关键品质——

qualities, but he will also probably lose experienced staff who could help in a crisis—another feature of lame-duck periods. The president's adventures abroad over the next two years promise to be chaotic and unpredictable, if not necessarily fruitful.
这些品质固然重要,但特朗普政府还将面临另一个问题:在危机时刻可能失去经验丰富的工作人员——这也是‘落日总统’时期的典型特征。未来两年,总统在海外的‘冒险’行程注定将充满混乱与不可预测性,尽管未必能带来实质性成果。
## 准备行装
## 两届任期美国总统*:任期最后两年在海外的天数
\- First term
- 第一任期
\- Second term
- 艾森豪威尔第二任期
Eisenhower
艾森豪威尔
Reagan
里根
Clinton
克林顿
G.W. Bush
乔治·沃克·布什
Obama
奥巴马
Trump
特朗普
\*Since 1945
自1945年以来
Source: US Department of State, Office of the Historian
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:Source: US Department of State, Office of the Historian]
Mr Trump will not be unique in searching for solace abroad as the end comes into sight. The Economist has analysed presidential travel records going back to Harry Truman. They show that presidents are typically much more active overseas in the last two years of their second terms (see chart). Mr Bush spent 50 days abroad in 2008, twice his previous annual average. After losing the 2006 midterms, he ordered a surge of military forces in Iraq against bitter opposition in Congress in the hope of salvaging a war that had gone badly awry. Barack Obama doubled his travel between the final two years of his first and second terms. His sweeping nuclear deal with Iran came the year after his own bruising in the 2014 midterms. “Presidents by the end of their term are frustrated with the various constraints on them,” says Yuval Levin of the American Enterprise Institute, a think-tank, who served in the Bush administration. “And foreign policy is where there are fewest constraints.”
特朗普并非在任期末寻求海外慰藉的唯一总统。英国《经济学人》杂志分析了自杜鲁门以来的总统出访记录,数据显示,总统在第二任期最后两年通常会大幅增加海外活动(见示意图)。小布什在2008年出访50天,是其此前年均出访时间的两倍。在2006年中期选举失利后,他下令对伊拉克增兵,尽管国会内部反对强烈,但他试图挽救已严重失控的战争。奥巴马在第一任期和第二任期最后两年的出访次数翻倍。其与伊朗达成的全面核协议出台于他自身在2014年中期选举中遭遇重创之后。《美国企业研究所》智库的尤瓦尔·莱文(Yuval Levin)曾在布什政府任职,他指出:“总统在任期末往往会对各种限制感到沮丧,而外交政策领域则是约束最少的领域。”
Mr Trump, like an impresario who changes the act when the audience grows weary, is drawn to foreign-policy manoeuvres that confound his critics and, in his mind, demonstrate his strength. Mr Trump has long boasted of his diplomatic prowess, famously claiming that he would end the Ukraine war in a day—and, at a midterms rally on November 1st, that he would have won the Vietnam war in a week. Mr Trump’s evident failure to win the war at hand, with Iran, therefore rankles with him. The two sides continue to skirmish, with America conducting what it described as “defensive” air strikes on November 2nd.
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:Mr Trump, like an impresario who changes the act when the audience grows weary, is drawn to foreign-policy manoeuvres that confound his critics and, in his mind, demonstrate his strength. Mr Trump has long boasted of his diplomatic prowess, famously claiming that he would end the Ukraine war in a day—and, at a midterms rally on November 1st, that he would have won the Vietnam war in a week. Mr Trump’s evident failure to win the war at hand, with Iran, therefore rankles with him. The two sides continue to skirmish, with America conducting what it described as “defensive” air strikes on November 2nd.]
Countries struck by US forces under Trump
特朗普政府时期遭美国军事打击的国家
■ Strikes threatened
■ 受威胁的军事打击计划

\*Some strikes conducted under joint operations
$^{\dagger}$ And Laccadive Sea $^{\ddagger}$ Includes the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman Sources: ACLED; press reports
Until recently Mr Trump was leaning towards his third attack on Iran in 18 months (see map), in concert with Israel, to force it to fully reopen the Strait of Hormuz and limit its nuclear programme. That would trigger Iranian retaliation against Gulf energy facilities, consuming Mr Trump's attention for months to come. On October 28th Chris Murphy, a Democratic senator, said that he had received an intelligence briefing on America's war plans. "I will just say this—their plan is insane," said Mr Murphy, noting that public reporting had pointed to the targeting of civilian infrastructure. "It will lead to devastating escalation and the likely destruction of our commitment to the rule of law." (Three days later Mr Murphy went to hospital after suffering a stroke.) A person familiar with the planning says that Mr Trump was considering whether to strike Iranian oil tankers in Asia.
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:Until recently Mr Trump was leaning towards his third attack on Iran in 18 months (see map), in concert with Israel, to force it to fully reopen the Strait of Hormuz and limit its nuclear programme. That would trigger Iranian retaliation against Gulf energy facilities, consuming Mr Trump's attention for months to come. On October 28th Chris Murphy, a Democratic senator, said that he had received an intelligence briefing on America's war plans. "I will just say this—their plan is insane," said Mr Murphy, noting that public reporting had pointed to the targeting of civilian infrastructure. "It will lead to devastating escalation and the likely destruction of our commitment to the rule of law." (Three days later Mr Murphy went to hospital after suffering a stroke.) A person familiar with the planning says that Mr Trump was considering whether to strike Iranian oil tankers in Asia.]
In recent days other sources say that Mr Trump has put these plans on ice, telling Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel's prime minister, that America will not back an Israeli attack. Israeli forces, which were ready for a strike, have paused their preparations.
近日,其他消息来源称特朗普已暂停相关计划,并向以色列总理内塔尼亚胡(Binyamin Netanyahu)明确表示,美国不会支持以色列发动军事行动。已做好攻击准备的以色列军队随即暂停了相关军事准备工作。
Mr Trump will face opposition to fresh strikes from multiple sources. One is J.D. Vance, his vice-president—and a probable candidate for president in 2028—who, in a post on X on November 4th, explicitly blamed the midterms drubbing on the war and said voters wanted a different relationship with Israel. Another is Congress. Such is the scale of the blue wave and so detested is the war—on a par with the Vietnam war—that Democrats might withhold funding (and risk being accused of undermining the troops in the field). Even if Mr Trump chooses to escalate, America is unlikely to have the munitions, air-defence interceptors or political stomach for another protracted campaign. Mr Trump’s aim is presumably to secure a deal that allows him to emerge from the fracas with the appearance of an honourable peace. Iran’s leadership, conscious of Mr Trump’s political frailty, is unlikely to fold easily.
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:Mr Trump will face opposition to fresh strikes from multiple sources. One is J.D. Vance, his vice-president—and a probable candidate for president in 2028—who, in a post on X on November 4th, explicitly blamed the midterms drubbing on the war and said voters wanted a different relationship with Israel. Another is Congress. Such is the scale of the blue wave and so detested is the war—on a par with the Vietnam war—that Democrats might withhold funding (and risk being accused of undermining the troops in the field). Even if Mr Trump chooses to escalate, America is unlikely to have the munitions, air-defence interceptors or political stomach for another protracted campaign. Mr Trump’s aim is presumably to secure a deal that allows him to emerge from the fracas with the appearance of an honourable peace. Iran’s leadership, conscious of Mr Trump’s political frailty, is unlikely to fold easily.]
If Iran is the first test of Mr Trump's diplomatic agenda, Ukraine is likely to be the second. Here the president's vengeful instincts present dangers. Mr Trump has repeatedly blamed Ukraine for the war, criticised the country's strikes on Russian oil refineries and belittled Volodymyr Zelensky, its president. So far American intelligence-sharing with Ukraine and arms sales via Europe have survived. When American negotiators unveiled a half-baked 28-point peace plan, in November 2025, Mr Trump's secretary of state, Marco Rubio, and European allies intervened to prune its worst parts. At each juncture, Mr Trump has stepped back from the breach of a complete abandonment of Ukraine and a definitive turn towards Russia.
特朗普总统的外交议程中,伊朗或将成为首个考验,而乌克兰则可能成为第二个。在此问题上,总统的报复性本能构成重大风险。特朗普一再将乌克兰战争归咎于该国,批评其对俄罗斯炼油厂的打击行动,并贬低乌克兰总统泽连斯基。迄今为止,美国与乌克兰的情报共享以及通过欧洲的军售尚未受到影响。当美国谈判代表于2025年11月公布一份不成熟的28条和平计划时,特朗普的国务卿马可·鲁比奥及欧洲盟友介入,削减了其中最恶劣的部分。在每个关键节点,特朗普都未采取完全放弃乌克兰并转向俄罗斯的举措。
Mr Trump may direct his ire once again at Mr Zelensky, should he conclude—wrongly—that Ukraine’s strikes on Russian refineries were primarily responsible for the fuel-price shock that helped doom Republicans at the polls. In 2020 Mr Trump responded furiously after believing that China had misled him over the spread of covid-19. A similar sense of betrayal could translate into a more aggressive pressure campaign against Mr Zelensky personally and Ukraine as a whole, with the aim of forcing Ukraine’s capitulation.
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:Mr Trump may direct his ire once again at Mr Zelensky, should he conclude—wrongly—that Ukraine’s strikes on Russian refineries were primarily responsible for the fuel-price shock that helped doom Republicans at the polls. In 2020 Mr Trump responded furiously after believing that China had misled him over the spread of covid-19. A similar sense of betrayal could translate into a more aggressive pressure campaign against Mr Zelensky personally and Ukraine as a whole, with the aim of forcing Ukraine’s capitulation.]
An early glimpse of Mr Trump's post-midterms mood may come on November 18th-19th, when he and Mr Putin visit Shenzhen, China, for an international summit hosted by Mr Xi. America's European allies fret that Ukraine will be on the menu. In recent months, Mr Trump has made concession after concession to Russia, cutting a deal to buy diesel and waiving sanctions in return for the release of an American prisoner, in part to lure Mr Putin to the negotiating table. Mr Putin may conclude that he will never again enjoy as pliant a partner as Mr Trump. But the Russian leader also believes that time is on his side, and that European support for Ukraine will ebb away. What is more, Democrats in Congress can be expected to hinder or block efforts by Mr Trump to give Mr Putin more ground on Ukraine—especially any deal that reeks of corruption.
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:An early glimpse of Mr Trump's post-midterms mood may come on November 18th-19th, when he and Mr Putin visit Shenzhen, China, for an international summit hosted by Mr Xi. America's European allies fret that Ukraine will be on the menu. In recent months, Mr Trump has made concession after concession to Russia, cutting a deal to buy diesel and waiving sanctions in return for the release of an American prisoner, in part to lure Mr Putin to the negotiating table. Mr Putin may conclude that he will never again enjoy as pliant a partner as Mr Trump. But the Russian leader also believes that time is on his side, and that European support for Ukraine will ebb away. What is more, Democrats in Congress can be expected to hinder or block efforts by Mr Trump to give Mr Putin more ground on Ukraine—especially any deal that reeks of corruption.]
The president may quickly lose interest (not for the first time) in the quagmire of Ukraine and turn his attention to another developing hot spot in his own hemisphere: Cuba. Since taking office, Mr Trump has squeezed Cuba's dictatorship economically, causing power cuts, food shortages and a collapse of health care on the island. In January 2026 the president decapitated Venezuela's government by abducting Nicolás Maduro, its leader. He is thought to be tempted by a similar model of light-touch regime change in Cuba.
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:The president may quickly lose interest (not for the first time) in the quagmire of Ukraine and turn his attention to another developing hot spot in his own hemisphere: Cuba. Since taking office, Mr Trump has squeezed Cuba's dictatorship economically, causing power cuts, food shortages and a collapse of health care on the island. In January 2026 the president decapitated Venezuela's government by abducting Nicolás Maduro, its leader. He is thought to be tempted by a similar model of light-touch regime change in Cuba.]
America's economic warfare is intended both to weaken the regime and split the country's elite, potentially throwing up partners who might work with America, much as Delcy Rodríguez, Venezuela's acting leader, abandoned Mr Maduro. Mr Trump has made little secret of his goal. "We'll take care of Cuba on our way back from Iran," he boasted on the campaign trail in October. That month Mr Rubio, a Cuban-American hawk, urged disaffected Cubans to work with the CIA: "To those who seek to create positive change in Cuba—now is the time."
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:America's economic warfare is intended both to weaken the regime and split the country's elite, potentially throwing up partners who might work with America, much as Delcy Rodríguez, Venezuela's acting leader, abandoned Mr Maduro. Mr Trump has made little secret of his goal. "We'll take care of Cuba on our way back from Iran," he boasted on the campaign trail in October. That month Mr Rubio, a Cuban-American hawk, urged disaffected Cubans to work with the CIA: "To those who seek to create positive change in Cuba—now is the time."]
Mr Trump longs to be a president who achieves what his predecessors did not. He would relish being the leader who reversed the Cuban communist victory of 1959. But he is not a man for details. In Venezuela he has largely left the country's dictatorship in place, swapping its leaders and cutting grubby deals to secure its oil for American firms. A fudge like that would be far harder to pull off in Cuba, notes a person with knowledge of the administration's debates, because Cuba's diaspora—which is older and more established than Venezuela's—would make its wrath felt.
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:Mr Trump longs to be a president who achieves what his predecessors did not. He would relish being the leader who reversed the Cuban communist victory of 1959. But he is not a man for details. In Venezuela he has largely left the country's dictatorship in place, swapping its leaders and cutting grubby deals to secure its oil for American firms. A fudge like that would be far harder to pull off in Cuba, notes a person with knowledge of the administration's debates, because Cuba's diaspora—which is older and more established than Venezuela's—would make its wrath felt.]
It would arguably help Mr Trump's chances of success in his foreign-policy endeavours if he had experienced staffers around him. But an exodus may be under way. Mr Rubio, who also serves as national security adviser, has quietly been exploring jobs in the private sector. (He may skip the 2028 presidential race, hoping for more favourable conditions in 2032.) Mr Rubio's departure would shift the balance of the administration, potentially leaving John Ratcliffe, the director of the CIA, as the most influential hawk in the cabinet.
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:It would arguably help Mr Trump's chances of success in his foreign-policy endeavours if he had experienced staffers around him. But an exodus may be under way. Mr Rubio, who also serves as national security adviser, has quietly been exploring jobs in the private sector. (He may skip the 2028 presidential race, hoping for more favourable conditions in 2032.) Mr Rubio's departure would shift the balance of the administration, potentially leaving John Ratcliffe, the director of the CIA, as the most influential hawk in the cabinet.]
The president may also lose his favourite man at the Pentagon. Many Democrats want to impeach Pete Hegseth, the pugnacious and divisive secretary of war. Hakeem Jeffries, the likely Democratic Speaker of the House, has not ruled it out.
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:The president may also lose his favourite man at the Pentagon. Many Democrats want to impeach Pete Hegseth, the pugnacious and divisive secretary of war. Hakeem Jeffries, the likely Democratic Speaker of the House, has not ruled it out.]
Democrats may demand Mr Hegseth's ousting as the price of passing an \$87.6bn supplemental bill including \$67bn for the Department of War, which is in a deep financial hole. Presidents often seek scapegoats after an electoral pummelling. Mr Bush dumped Donald Rumsfeld, his defence secretary, after his midterm loss in 2006; Mr Trump sacked Jeff Sessions, his then attorney-general, after his party's defeat in the House in 2018.
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:Democrats may demand Mr Hegseth's ousting as the price of passing an \$87.6bn supplemental bill including \$67bn for the Department of War, which is in a deep financial hole. Presidents often seek scapegoats after an electoral pummelling. Mr Bush dumped Donald Rumsfeld, his defence secretary, after his midterm loss in 2006; Mr Trump sacked Jeff Sessions, his then attorney-general, after his party's defeat in the House in 2018.]
Yet Mr Trump is more likely to respond with defiance than with contrition. There is speculation that Mr Hegseth could be shunted into the job of national security adviser or possibly appointed to the Senate seat for Tennessee that is to be vacated in January by Marsha Blackburn, who has been elected the state's governor. There, some note, he would enjoy a degree of protection from Democratic probes—including those into his deadly strikes on boats thought to be carrying drugs.
[⚠️ 翻译失败:翻译结果为空且重试耗尽 | 原文:Yet Mr Trump is more likely to respond with defiance than with contrition. There is speculation that Mr Hegseth could be shunted into the job of national security adviser or possibly appointed to the Senate seat for Tennessee that is to be vacated in January by Marsha Blackburn, who has been elected the state's governor. There, some note, he would enjoy a degree of protection from Democratic probes—including those into his deadly strikes on boats thought to be carrying drugs.]
By Invitation | Vote, splurge
But Democrats will struggle to unwind the president's agenda, writes Tomas Philipson

Nov 5th 2026
THE RESULT of America's midterm elections occurred under two sets of conflicting facts: by many conventional measures the economy is performing above average, yet Americans remain deeply dissatisfied with their economic circumstances, displaying attitudes in surveys more typical of those during a recession.
And America is far from being in that predicament. Real GDP grew at a healthy 3.4% annual rate in the third quarter, up from 2.2% in the second. Unemployment and layoffs are low and the roaring expansion in investment, partly thanks to an AI sector free from excessive regulation, offers reasons for optimism about future productivity. Yet the University of Michigan's consumer-sentiment index stood at just 48.0 in October, down from 53.6 a year earlier. Its index of current economic conditions was even lower, at 46.7. Such readings have in the past been associated with severe economic stress.
The election results may be explained in part by a continued—and generally faster-than-expected—rise in the prices of food, gasoline, housing and much else. Many households with rising nominal wages have endured real wage declines this year.
Democrats naturally took full advantage of public anxiety over affordability during the election campaign. They omitted to mention that much of the rise in prices happened on Joe Biden's watch. The unadjusted CPI-U consumer-price index jumped by $21.4\%$ during his four years in office, compared with $6.1\%$ during the first 20 months of Donald Trump's second term.
The economic statistics are not wrong, and households are not imagining their bills. They are looking at different dimensions of economic activity and prosperity. Until real wage growth makes the cumulative inflation shock less painful, Americans may continue to feel economically insecure even as the aggregate economy expands. Ordinary voters do not experience the economy as a quarterly GDP rate or a stock index. They experience it through how much their paycheques can buy and, as this election illustrated, that purchasing power is not always synchronised with the aggregate statistics.
Voters mostly blame the Iran war and tariffs for persistent inflation. The irony of this election is that these are the two policies the new Democratic Congress will find hardest to reverse.
Start with the Iran war. The president began it in February without congressional authorisation. A resolution to curb his war powers would need support from two-thirds of both chambers to survive his veto, and Democrats are well short of that. And much as the new
Congress may wish to choke off funding for what it sees as military adventurism, few members would vote to defund troops already in the field.
It is a similar story with tariffs. After an adverse ruling by the Supreme Court in February, the administration reissued the duties under another statute, limited to 150 days unless Congress extends the term. The administration then moved them to a more permanent "Section 301" footing. Democrats can ask for, or trade, exemptions for particular countries or goods, but any broader reversal would be vetoed by the president.
Other parts of the White House agenda will survive the election as well. Chief among them is Mr Trump's welcome deregulatory programme. An executive order signed in January 2025 told agencies to retire ten rules for every new one. Its impact has been impressive: in the 2025 fiscal year, the White House regulatory office counted 646 deregulatory actions against five new rules, with claimed savings of \$212bn.
Much of the deregulation drive is baked in for this Congress. It is true that federal-agency rules issued towards the very end of any given Congress can be overturned by the subsequent one using the Congressional Review Act “lookback” mechanism. However, the administration will probably aim to finish its major rules through notice-and-comment rulemaking well before 2028, meaning that fewer of them will be reversible.
The election's fiscal impact is less clear. If recent history is a guide, the new divided government will agree to spend more, not less. Since 2013, whenever a president has lacked full control of Congress or needed opposition votes in the Senate, the budget deal that followed has raised spending on both parties' priorities at once. Republicans got more for defence, Democrats more for domestic programmes. In a classic logroll, each side voted for the other's spending to secure its own. The 2013 and 2015 deals kept "parity", with equal increases for defence and non-defence spending. In 2018 Senate Republicans
counted it a win that defence rose more than domestic spending, but they still conceded \$131bn more for domestic programmes over two years.
This recent history cuts against a long-held view that divided government acts as a brake on spending. For instance, William Niskanen of the Cato Institute, a think-tank, found that, from Dwight Eisenhower to Bill Clinton, real federal spending grew more slowly when the two parties split control of Washington.
The horse-trading of the past decade and a half points in a different direction. Each of the deals came under split control, or when the minority's Senate votes were needed, and each raised spending above the limits Congress had set for itself. On the annual budget, in short, divided governments have become a way for each side to buy the other's agreement with additional spending. Added to which, this is a White House that likes to make deals. Only an optimist could expect growth in government debt, and the associated risk of higher interest rates, to be lessened by the new gridlock.
Tomas J. Philipson was acting chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers during President Donald Trump's first term.
By Invitation | Charge!
The transformation can't be left to market forces alone, writes Murat Kurum, president of COP31

Nov 5th 2026
FOR 30 YEARS global climate talks have focused on what's feeding power systems. The defining battles of the annual COP UN climate summits have been between wind turbines and chimney stacks; solar panels and pipelines. How we use that power to electrify buildings, transport and industry has been largely ignored, despite these sectors producing almost half of emissions.
Like a northern European city this summer, electrification is now getting its day in the sun. An opportunity has opened up as the economics have shifted. Energy prices are rising sharply, cost-of-living pressures are biting and green-technology costs are plummeting. Preliminary data indicate markets are moving this year as more electric tech is shifting off the shelves.
Campaigners often insist the economic case for green technology is clear. But hopes that market forces alone will solve the energy transition are misplaced. Even with building momentum, existing trends indicate electrification is expanding too slowly—from meeting 23% of the world’s final energy consumption today to 29% by 2035. This is not the 35% that the science says will keep climate goals within reach. State intervention is still needed, urgently.
The Paris agreement of 2015 legally required countries to submit regular climate plans. These plans have been the main mechanism for driving climate policy. However, in the latest round of plans electrification was largely absent.
Too often, electrification targets are merely implicit within headline emission-reduction goals. Think of it like neglecting to produce an AI strategy because you already have a headline growth target. Statements of government commitment, bespoke policy frameworks and incentive structures are all essential to sending important market signals.
Since the start of the conflict in the Gulf, 25 countries have announced new policies to support greater electrification. That is a start, but not enough. Specifically, they must focus on reducing the payback periods of investing in electric tech and guaranteeing the infrastructure to make it work.
Rarely is electric tech cheaper upfront. For consumers, the economic case rests on higher efficiency and lower running costs. Electric vehicles use 70-80% less energy and can save between \$200 and \$1,500 per year. But too often, it still takes too long to pay back the initial premium.
The relative cost of electricity compared to fossil fuels is critical. The European Commission recently found that once electricity costs more than 2.5 times as much as natural gas, the case for households to switch to heat pumps weakens sharply. Policymakers can intervene by reforming the tapestries of taxes and subsidies on different energy sources. In some developed countries, taxes make up 30% of the cost of residential electricity, and most EU countries tax electricity more than natural gas. Reforms need balancing against fiscal and socioeconomic needs, but the overall imperative to rebalance in favour of electricity remains.
To reduce upfront costs, governments have long deployed a mixture of direct subsidies, preferential tax rates and social-support schemes. Türkiye's rapid adoption of electric vehicles has been driven by reductions in value-added tax that lower sticker prices at the dealership.
Multilateral development banks and other development-finance institutions can also use grant-based and concessional capital along with loan guarantees to lower the cost of capital. This is particularly important for developing countries, which face far higher borrowing costs that are holding back investment.
But these incentives cost money. In a fiscally constrained world, electrification must fight harder for a share of a shrinking pie. Nevertheless, as the inherent risks of energy import dependency come more sharply into view, governments should be ready to review the case for more aggressive support. This year 95 countries have introduced emergency price caps, subsidies or fuel-levy cuts to support consumers. Public money might be better spent subsidising the equipment needed to reduce exposure to volatile global markets.
Governments must also give consumers confidence that once they have bought their electric appliance, they will be able to run it. Otherwise, they will not risk the investment. However, 730m people lack electricity, and millions more have only unreliable access. Even in rich countries, low investment in grids is a constraint. There is simply no transition without transmission. Around \$1trn is needed each year for grids and storage between now and 2030. Permitting times need to be shortened. Outdated policy and regulatory frameworks that are based on old fuel sources rather than renewables need reform.
So how to kick-start progress? As chair of COP31, Türkiye is making electrification the golden thread, or copper wire, connecting all our efforts. We have proposed a global “35-by-35” target—35% electrification by 2035—to focus minds and enable us to track progress. Türkiye is also leading by example and will publish its national energy plan at COP as part of our efforts to reduce spending on energy imports from 2.1% of GDP to 0.7% by 2050.
Everyone will have their own pathway. Broadly speaking, developed countries will favour electric cars, heat pumps, low-level industrial heating and AI-driven grid optimisation. Developing countries will focus more on electric bikes, cooking-stoves and industrial motors, which require expanding basic electricity access. They will also need more support from international donors.
Overall, we cannot leave electrification to market forces alone. They will not fully deliver the potential for energy security, affordability and emission reductions. We need a partnership where governments enable the private sector to throw its full weight behind electrification. Türkiye will use the summit to press everyone to show what more they can do. In the end, success will be measured in cleaner air, lower global temperatures and communities no longer at the mercy of violently convulsing global energy markets. The International Energy Agency shows that the 35-by-35 target could save \$500bn each year in avoided fuel imports. Markets have started this journey. Governments need to finish it.
Murat Kurum is Turkey's environment minister and president of the COP31 climate-change conference.
• What will a lame-duck Donald Trump get up to overseas?
Briefing | After the midterms
Embattled at home, the president will look abroad. That is worrying for the world, but it is not clear what he can achieve—for good or ill

Nov 5th 2026
DOUG SOSNIK, a former adviser to Bill Clinton, recalls the president's frenetic agenda during his final stretch in the White House. "We talked about the schedule and how many more trips we could do—do you mind doing an 18-hour day?" Mr Clinton was a man in a hurry. "I've only got a year left in office," he observed. "I've got the rest of my life to sleep."
The same clock now ticks for Donald Trump. He has been the defining protagonist of the past decade in American politics. But on November 3rd he became only the second term-limited president, after George W. Bush in 2006, to fight his final midterm election in control of both chambers of Congress and to lose both, shocking Mr Trump himself. "Wow," he told the New York Times upon learning of his party's loss in South Carolina, a former MAGA stronghold. "That's amazing."
In his final two years in office, Mr Trump will be embattled at home as he confronts his political mortality. Congress, which Mr Trump had rendered largely irrelevant while under Republican control, will swamp his administration with hearings and subpoenas on corruption and abuse of power. ("Lawyer up," one congressman advised on X.) It will dare him to veto popular policies such as restoring health-care funding. Democrats will try to stop his vanity pursuits in the capital, too: his grand ballroom and his triumphal arch. But the area where he will continue to have the greatest, most unrestrained impact is overseas, where he will turn for monsters to slay and legacies to leave.
Mr Trump's foreign policy—from Venezuela to Greenland to Iran—has been radical and hyperactive. Now it could become more so. Mr Trump has unfinished business in Iran and Cuba that could drag America deeper into the Middle East and Latin America. His flirtation with great-power carve-ups, including summitry with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, could herald a darker world order—and difficulties for Ukraine. His quixotic courtship of Kim Jong Un, North Korea's leader, could upturn American nuclear policy. All this will unfold as AI wizardry spirals towards artificial general intelligence, throwing up diplomatic and national-security challenges that will fall to Mr Trump to manage.
All this would be concerning enough for the world under a president who had a gift for diplomacy, a Herculean work ethic and a normal attention span. Mr Trump not only will have to do without those

qualities, but he will also probably lose experienced staff who could help in a crisis—another feature of lame-duck periods. The president's adventures abroad over the next two years promise to be chaotic and unpredictable, if not necessarily fruitful.
\- First term
\- Second term
Eisenhower
Reagan
Clinton
G.W. Bush
Obama
Trump
\*Since 1945
Source: US Department of State, Office of the Historian
Mr Trump will not be unique in searching for solace abroad as the end comes into sight. The Economist has analysed presidential travel records going back to Harry Truman. They show that presidents are typically much more active overseas in the last two years of their
second terms (see chart). Mr Bush spent 50 days abroad in 2008, twice his previous annual average. After losing the 2006 midterms, he ordered a surge of military forces in Iraq against bitter opposition in Congress in the hope of salvaging a war that had gone badly awry. Barack Obama doubled his travel between the final two years of his first and second terms. His sweeping nuclear deal with Iran came the year after his own bruising in the 2014 midterms. “Presidents by the end of their term are frustrated with the various constraints on them,” says Yuval Levin of the American Enterprise Institute, a think-tank, who served in the Bush administration. “And foreign policy is where there are fewest constraints.”
Mr Trump, like an impresario who changes the act when the audience grows weary, is drawn to foreign-policy manoeuvres that confound his critics and, in his mind, demonstrate his strength. Mr Trump has long boasted of his diplomatic prowess, famously claiming that he would end the Ukraine war in a day—and, at a midterms rally on November 1st, that he would have won the Vietnam war in a week. Mr Trump’s evident failure to win the war at hand, with Iran, therefore rankles with him. The two sides continue to skirmish, with America conducting what it described as “defensive” air strikes on November 2nd.
Countries struck by US forces under Trump
■ Strikes threatened

\*Some strikes conducted under joint operations
$^{\dagger}$ And Laccadive Sea $^{\ddagger}$ Includes the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman Sources: ACLED; press reports
Until recently Mr Trump was leaning towards his third attack on Iran in 18 months (see map), in concert with Israel, to force it to fully reopen the Strait of Hormuz and limit its nuclear programme. That would trigger Iranian retaliation against Gulf energy facilities, consuming Mr Trump's attention for months to come. On October 28th Chris Murphy, a Democratic senator, said that he had received an intelligence briefing on America's war plans. "I will just say this—their plan is insane," said Mr Murphy, noting that public reporting had pointed to the targeting of civilian infrastructure. "It will lead to devastating escalation and the likely destruction of our commitment to the rule of law." (Three days later Mr Murphy went to hospital after suffering a stroke.) A person familiar with the planning says that Mr Trump was considering whether to strike Iranian oil tankers in Asia.
In recent days other sources say that Mr Trump has put these plans on ice, telling Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel's prime minister, that America will not back an Israeli attack. Israeli forces, which were ready for a strike, have paused their preparations.
Mr Trump will face opposition to fresh strikes from multiple sources. One is J.D. Vance, his vice-president—and a probable candidate for president in 2028—who, in a post on X on November 4th, explicitly blamed the midterms drubbing on the war and said voters wanted a different relationship with Israel. Another is Congress. Such is the scale of the blue wave and so detested is the war—on a par with the Vietnam war—that Democrats might withhold funding (and risk being accused of undermining the troops in the field). Even if Mr Trump chooses to escalate, America is unlikely to have the munitions, air-defence interceptors or political stomach for another protracted campaign. Mr Trump’s aim is presumably to secure a deal that allows him to emerge from the fracas with the appearance of an honourable peace. Iran’s leadership, conscious of Mr Trump’s political frailty, is unlikely to fold easily.
If Iran is the first test of Mr Trump's diplomatic agenda, Ukraine is likely to be the second. Here the president's vengeful instincts
present dangers. Mr Trump has repeatedly blamed Ukraine for the war, criticised the country's strikes on Russian oil refineries and belittled Volodymyr Zelensky, its president. So far American intelligence-sharing with Ukraine and arms sales via Europe have survived. When American negotiators unveiled a half-baked 28-point peace plan, in November 2025, Mr Trump's secretary of state, Marco Rubio, and European allies intervened to prune its worst parts. At each juncture, Mr Trump has stepped back from the breach of a complete abandonment of Ukraine and a definitive turn towards Russia.
Mr Trump may direct his ire once again at Mr Zelensky, should he conclude—wrongly—that Ukraine’s strikes on Russian refineries were primarily responsible for the fuel-price shock that helped doom Republicans at the polls. In 2020 Mr Trump responded furiously after believing that China had misled him over the spread of covid-19. A similar sense of betrayal could translate into a more aggressive pressure campaign against Mr Zelensky personally and Ukraine as a whole, with the aim of forcing Ukraine’s capitulation.
An early glimpse of Mr Trump's post-midterms mood may come on November 18th-19th, when he and Mr Putin visit Shenzhen, China, for an international summit hosted by Mr Xi. America's European allies fret that Ukraine will be on the menu. In recent months, Mr Trump has made concession after concession to Russia, cutting a deal to buy diesel and waiving sanctions in return for the release of an American prisoner, in part to lure Mr Putin to the negotiating table. Mr Putin may conclude that he will never again enjoy as pliant a partner as Mr Trump. But the Russian leader also believes that time is on his side, and that European support for Ukraine will ebb away. What is more, Democrats in Congress can be expected to hinder or block efforts by Mr Trump to give Mr Putin more ground on Ukraine—especially any deal that reeks of corruption.
The president may quickly lose interest (not for the first time) in the quagmire of Ukraine and turn his attention to another developing hot spot in his own hemisphere: Cuba. Since taking office, Mr Trump has squeezed Cuba's dictatorship economically, causing power cuts, food shortages and a collapse of health care on the island. In January 2026 the president decapitated Venezuela's government by abducting Nicolás Maduro, its leader. He is thought to be tempted by a similar model of light-touch regime change in Cuba.
America's economic warfare is intended both to weaken the regime and split the country's elite, potentially throwing up partners who might work with America, much as Delcy Rodríguez, Venezuela's acting leader, abandoned Mr Maduro. Mr Trump has made little secret of his goal. "We'll take care of Cuba on our way back from Iran," he boasted on the campaign trail in October. That month Mr Rubio, a Cuban-American hawk, urged disaffected Cubans to work with the CIA: "To those who seek to create positive change in Cuba—now is the time."
Mr Trump longs to be a president who achieves what his predecessors did not. He would relish being the leader who reversed the Cuban communist victory of 1959. But he is not a man for details. In Venezuela he has largely left the country's dictatorship in place, swapping its leaders and cutting grubby deals to secure its oil for American firms. A fudge like that would be far harder to pull off in Cuba, notes a person with knowledge of the administration's debates, because Cuba's diaspora—which is older and more established than Venezuela's—would make its wrath felt.
It would arguably help Mr Trump's chances of success in his foreign-policy endeavours if he had experienced staffers around him. But an exodus may be under way. Mr Rubio, who also serves as national security adviser, has quietly been exploring jobs in the private sector. (He may skip the 2028 presidential race, hoping for more favourable conditions in 2032.) Mr Rubio's departure would shift the balance of the administration, potentially leaving John Ratcliffe, the director of the CIA, as the most influential hawk in the cabinet.
The president may also lose his favourite man at the Pentagon. Many Democrats want to impeach Pete Hegseth, the pugnacious and divisive secretary of war. Hakeem Jeffries, the likely Democratic Speaker of the House, has not ruled it out.
Democrats may demand Mr Hegseth's ousting as the price of passing an \$87.6bn supplemental bill including \$67bn for the Department of War, which is in a deep financial hole. Presidents often seek scapegoats after an electoral pummelling. Mr Bush dumped Donald Rumsfeld, his defence secretary, after his midterm loss in 2006; Mr Trump sacked Jeff Sessions, his then attorney-general, after his party's defeat in the House in 2018.
Yet Mr Trump is more likely to respond with defiance than with contrition. There is speculation that Mr Hegseth could be shunted into the job of national security adviser or possibly appointed to the Senate seat for Tennessee that is to be vacated in January by Marsha Blackburn, who has been elected the state's governor. There, some note, he would enjoy a degree of protection from Democratic probes—including those into his deadly strikes on boats thought to be carrying drugs.
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原因:
✅ 存在严重阻塞性问题(Critical Blockers)